[ Music ]
[ Growling and Panting ]
[ Speaking in Foreign Language ]
>> Hey, wait.
Don't! Great.
[ Whining ]
[ Speaking in Foreign Language ]
[ Splashing ]
[ Music ]
>> Look, I know you probably don't understand this, but --
[ Speaking in Foreign Language ]
-- thank you.
[ Speaking in Foreign Language ]
Thank you.
I would have been screwed if you hadn't come along because --
[ Music ]
Hey, wait a second.
Hey, where are you going?
Wait up. Just -- hey, slow down.
Wait up, I just want to say thanks
for killing those things [hitting].
Ahh! Damn!
>> Don't thank.
You don't thank for this.
This is sad, very sad only.
>> Okay, okay.
I'm sorry.
Whatever I did I am sorry.
>> Well, this is your fault.
They did not need to die.
>> My fault?
They attacked me.
How am I the bad guy?
>> Your fault.
>> I -- ooh.
>> Your fault.
>> Easy, easy.
>> You're like a baby making noise, don't know what to do.
>> Easy. Fine, fine, if you love your little forest friends why
not let them just kill my ass?
What's the thinking?
>> I save you.
>> Yeah, why save me?
Well, if I'm like a child then look, maybe you should teach me.
>> Sky people cannot learn.
You do not see.
>> Then teach me how to see.
>> No one can teach you to see.
>> Whoa. Look, come on.
Can't we talk?
Say, where'd you learn to speak English?
Dr. Augustine's school?
Little help.
>> You're like a baby [speaking in foreign language].
[ Music ]
>> I need your help.
>> Hello, welcome to this brief introduction
to Environmental Ethics.
I'm K.D. Borkman, and the purpose of this is simply
to give you a brief overview of some
of the terminology typically used
in environmental ethics-type courses and also to demonstrate
in what way you might be able to use Camtasia in order
to embed video and create captions.
The sue of the "Avatar" video clip, courtesy of James Cameron,
this movie, "Avatar," is designed to kind
of stimulate a little bit of interest with respect to some
of the kinds of concerns we might have with respect
to our attitude toward the environment.
And I do think that that movie to some extent,
maybe rather stereotypically, does depict the industrial view
versus the more primal view.
And it does seem to me to be somewhat poignant
that the female extraterrestrial creature there does refer
to the incarnated protagonist as an infant when it comes
to his response to the environment
and his understanding and care for fauna and flora.
Let's take a look at some definitions.
Often we talk about moral agents not only in a context
of environmental ethics but also in the context
of just about any ethics.
And we may define them as those who have the freedom
and rational capacity to be responsible for choices.
This, of course, does rest on a metaphysical view
about what human beings are.
This gets us into, to some extent, the free will
versus determinism conversation, or dialogue,
or controversy even, that has been ongoing
and probably continue for as long as we are thinking
about these things from a philosophical point
of view throughout eternity, so to speak.
Examples of moral agents would have to be adult humans,
for example, of sound mind.
When we talk about sound mind I'm sure
that we probably all have different definitions
of what sound mind is all about, but probably one of the things
that could be regarded as a necessary condition
for having a sound mind is the idea
that a person is not constrained or compelled beyond his
or her individual autonomy to come to a decision or to engage
in a specific moral action.
A person of sound mind is an individual who is not
under the influence of some inebriating drug and is also,
presumably, a clear enough critical thinker to the degree
that that individual is going to be able to make judgments
that are ultimately objective.
And that might be asking too much for sound mind
for all I know, but it certainly is one avenue that we might take
in order to be able
to characterize what a sound mind is.
But generally once we get that down pat, more or less,
we can realize that some human beings might be restricted
from this notion of having a sound mind,
typically infants principally because of the fact
that they have not developed sufficiently to be able to come
to the point where they're autonomous.
When does autonomy begin?
When does complete mature viability begin?
Again, these are issues that are not completely maybe understood
well and agreed-upon by everybody,
but we do have a sense of that, I think,
in our common experience.
We would not hold a baby accountable for certain things,
nor would we hold, for example,
a dog or cat accountable strictly in a moral sense.
Mentally ill individuals are generally people who,
once that's been confirmed, are not regarded as moral agents.
They cannot be held responsible to the things they say,
do depending, of course, on the degree to which we have assessed
and evaluated the condition of such individuals.
What does it mean to have moral standing?
Well, it might be said that if you have moral standing you have
the idea that your continued existence is an intrinsic value,
even I suppose if none of us express it that way.
That is to say, your existence, your welfare is something
that is conceived to be valuable in and of itself.
And I think that that, of course,
is certainly a deontological way of putting it.
Maybe not everybody necessarily sees it that way.
But I think that this is a typical view that is reflected
when we consider what it means to be an individual or entity
that has moral standing.
Your interests and wellbeing must be weighed
when deciding what it is permissible to do,
which is to say that you are not necessarily under --
on this view under obligation to do something.
It's just what is morally permissible for you to do.
And I certainly am thinking that if we put this in the context
of a movie like "Avatar" --
of course, there are many other movies out there
that probably we could discuss and talk about --
you can see that the entities there, be they human
or be they humanoid, are probably entities
which we would regard as having moral standing.
Might look different, might have different cultures,
different lifestyles, but that would seem clearly
to be something we could say about what is being presented
in various scenarios in "Avatar."
And one would think that we could also bring it back
to Earth, so to speak, when we talk
about the relationship between, you know, the conquerors,
or the missionaries, so to speak,
and those who were conquered at some point in time.
So I certainly put this in a context
of Native American tradition.
Of course, some people, I think, have thought that obviously
"Avatar" was about that sort of thing.
And hopefully it didn't
as a movie completely mischaracterize the interaction
between let's say Europeans and indigenous people.
What are some examples of those who have moral standing?
Well, babies, children, adults.
You may be a moral agent on one set of criteria,
but not necessarily be able to engage in certain kinds
of activities if you happen to be infirm or disabled.
If you become debilitated, then you're not a moral agent.
But certainly even if you're not a moral agent you still have
moral standing regardless of gender, regardless of race,
regardless of ethnicity.
And I would think that, you know,
with that somewhat other controversial subject
of speciesism, brought up by many contemporary philosophers,
it may even be true regardless of species.
So one would say, again, that the beings that are
in "Avatar" probably can be said to have moral standing,
in which case there are certain things
that a moral agent might be either, A, obligated to do,
have a duty to do, or have a duty to behave with respect
to such creatures, or B, there are some things
that are not going to be permissible to do to them.
And I think it is that -- at least one of those things
that probably permeates through the movie "Avatar."
How about moral duties?
Moral agents owe something to those with moral standing.
And our task is to try to discover what that might be.
Now it might be that we have a kind a kind of a [inaudible] --
and probably this is embraced by other moral traditions
as well -- a duty not to kill children, for example,
insofar as they have a moral duty to them.
We also, according to the SPCA, Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals, and other organizations of similar ilk,
we have a duty to the pets that we acquire.
Could be anything from our dog and our cat
to our fish in a tank.
Now some people might argue that you don't necessarily have
that much of a duty to a fish insofar as fish, maybe,
don't have moral standing.
So you see, that's the question here of the notion
of the ever-widening circle of inclusion for moral standing,
something, I think, that does task many
environmental ethicists.
To what extent do we have moral duties not only
to other human beings, which seems to be obvious,
but how about moral duties to dogs, cats, and deer,
and a wild moose that you might see off in the distance,
or a coyote, or a cockroach,
or ants that are on your countertop?
That's a difficult one.
But at least a discussion
like this should prompt further discussion and dialogue
about just what kinds of moral duties we have.
And I think by talking this way probably would clarify some
of the other issues that do arise when maybe you have people
who are industrial types, industrial entrepreneurs
who want to go in and develop, you know, some property,
or acquire property in order to develop it.
And that property as such may have belonged,
so to speak, to indigenous people.
Do they have a duty not only to the indigenous people,
but perhaps even to the ecosystems that are going
to be affected by industrialization?
Let's ask this philosophical question,
who or what really does have moral standing and why?
And we might not be able to answer the why real quickly,
but how about the environment itself,
does it have moral standing?
You know, picture before you you have this wonderful waterfall.
It's almost an iconic symbol to some, Yosemite National Park.
John Muir and others have spent --
had spent in their lifetime many, many hours meditating
on the beauty and the aesthetic wonder
of such a beautiful scenario and landscape.
Would you say that Yosemite National Park or elements
within it have moral standing?
And of course, we also have to take
into consideration just what are the criteria
for having moral standing?
We talked a little bit about it, but there may be others.
What duty do we as moral agents have toward those
with moral standing?
And of course, this is where obviously you can get into a lot
of different viewpoints
that express slightly different orientations, and perspectives,
and paradigms about how to answer this.
A utilitarian would probably believe that, indeed,
those with moral duty do have certain obligations
to those with moral standing.
Certainly Kant, a deontologist, would.
Probably you could read Greek ethics, aretaic ethics,
in roughly the same way.
I'm sure that somebody like Aristotle, major spokesperson
for the aretaic tradition, would certainly have suggested
that there's a certain set of obligations
that moral agents have with respect to others,
although he might not have necessarily expressed it
in quite that language.
Couple of ideas about criteria for moral standing,
you could say -- and this might just be almost true
by definition, or redundant, even circular it seems to me --
membership in the species Homo sapiens.
Some people have argued that human beings,
unlike other creatures, have a soul.
That again, as you might know if you've ever followed some
of the literature, is a highly controversial, probably arguable
from some points of view.
Assertion, humans are moral agents,
and we hold them responsible for knowing right from wrong
at some point in time in their development,
and that usually has to do with some idea
about when a human being as it's growing up
and developing becomes somewhat autonomous,
able to make its own decisions.
Certain religious groups find, I suppose,
the idea that a person can become responsible
for knowing right from wrong at a relatively early age,
maybe seven or eight, some a little bit later, maybe 13, 14.
When exactly does that begin?
And I would simply iterate that a lot of these kinds
of assertions do have to do with some paradigm view
about what human nature is, and of course, that concept in
and of itself is worth studying in greater detail.
And then taking some reasonably coherent notion of human nature
and applying it to a study
of ethics probably would be quite profitable.
Human beings -- and, of course,
this doesn't exclude other entities -- are intelligent.
They have intelligence.
They have something we call personhood.
We have language, and all of these things are simply steps
in the direction or items
that may be included ultimately in a list of things.
One of the concepts here, personhood, of course,
which is extremely important to philosophy, it seems to me
on the whole, but clearly to its sub-branch ethics.
Personhood, you can parse that down a little bit further.
In fact, some philosophical systems see personhood
as the crux of, you know, the moral issue
and moral argumentation.
So the idea, of course, here is to try to figure out what
that concept means, personhood.
What does it mean to be a person?
One of the candidates is consciousness.
Another one is self-consciousness.
Another one can be identity, possibly having an interest
in continuation of one's existence,
possibly having some natural right, let us say,
to the pursuit of what one conceives to be happiness.
Autonomy usually at least is associated with full personhood.
But you see, it's very important for people to sit down, I think,
if they're very interested in something like this and try
to come up, maybe, with a list of necessary
and sufficient conditions, at least start that way,
of what it means to be a person.
And you know, the question remains here do you have
to have language in order to have moral standing?
Now ask yourself the question do you have
to have self-consciousness to have moral standing?
Would you have to have intelligence
to have moral standing?
If you say no to these then you're probably saying that none
of these choices are necessary, in which case would would have
to probably start from scratch and start talking
about what is personhood?
What is moral standing?
Is some concept of personhood related
to some concept of moral standing?
There are those, again, who expand that circle of inclusion,
who talk about the moral standing, let us say,
of Yosemite or some other things, clearly would have
to argue a little bit differently with other criteria
than are presented here, I would think, unless, of course,
you believed somehow that ecosystems have,
you know, intelligence.
I'm sure some people argue that.
Other -- another approach to take would be the idea
of sentience and the ability to feel pain.
I don't think sentience is the ability to feel pain in a sort
of synonymous sense here.
If you're sentient you're sentient you feel.
So presumably feeling pain, pleasure,
is a part of being sentient.
But we do know that certainly other primates,
obviously other species, could have moral standing
from the point of view merely of their sentience.
But there was -- you know, I suppose the question arises
to what degree are these creatures sentient,
or how complex is the sentience?
Would the flowers in your garden be sentient?
We do think that at least animals, and --
I think it becomes questionable when you start talking
about certain animals or certain other species --
but it's probable that a cockroach has sentience,
or an ant, or a wasp that has somehow made its way
into your house and you're not real happy about that.
You don't want that particular creature
in your environment for a lot of reasons.
If a cockroach, a spider,
or some such other thing does have moral standing based upon
sentience, or our ability at least to be able to infer
that these creatures are sentient,
then do we have certain moral obligations to them?
Just being alive.
Maybe just being alive, for some, is sufficient,
or at least necessary for moral standing.
So should animals -- other lower, quote, unquote --
I'll say that in scare quotes -- lower animals and plants,
insofar as they are alive,
do they have some kind of moral standing?
How about living things?
Now you see then when you talk about these things as well
as raise it up a level or two to ecosystems or systems
in general I think that the deep ecologists generally speaking,
and people like -- would say that ecosystems, eco-niches,
you know, things that taken collectively somehow have moral
standing, but certainly they aren't alive.
But they do contain live things.
Or they're not alive in the sense
in which we typically think of something as alive,
but if you really want to throw in a philosophical, I suppose,
conundrum here -- and hopefully not a red herring --
you can talk about the concept of live or being alive
from the point of view of the idea
that apparently biologically it's a little difficult
to actually define something that's alive
or when life begins.
So that might be yet another little thing that one would have
to deal with at some point in time.
Or get a more comprehensive notion
about what moral standing is.
How about being a part of nature?
So you know, think about it, if you're too inclusive
with respect to what moral standing is I suppose it could
be just everything, in which case you would think
that the concept of moral standing might actually become
so vague, or perhaps even ambiguous,
that we'd be committing kind of a fallacy
to include just about everything.
But how about, you know,
[inaudible] as I said previously ecosystems, rocks, rivers,
plants, animals, entire natural world.
Those systems of religious thought
which are somewhat more animistic
and possibly even pantheistic are those
which would probably include rocks and rivers.
And there is literature that suggests that, you know,
there are worldviews that include things
like rocks and rivers.
I know that it would be totally inappropriate to generalize,
but having studied some Native American philosophical
and religious trends I do believe that there are elements
of respect enough for rocks, rivers, hillsides, mountainsides
that it's safe to say that some
of those traditions would include these entities.
I think the deep ecologist Arne Naess has often remarked
that if we could just sit and think
like a mountain then perhaps we'd be able
to understand history, and its progress, and the relationships
that exist between and among various ecosystems, and fauna,
and flora in a different way.
Possibly the entire natural world.
Now that to me is yet another issue,
by the way, I want to raise here.
It's kind of like what is really natural versus unnatural,
or is a word that you could contrast with natural,
something like synthetic, or fabricated, or artifactual.
Are those in some sense opposites?
So you know, what does the natural world include?
And there have been many people who have argued,
and at least taken themselves
to be saying something really important, I suppose,
about suggesting that, well, what isn't natural?
I mean, humankind goes on to invent a technology,
and any invention of that technology, that would seem
to be a natural expression of a species-specific trait
for human beings, creativity, intelligence, etcetera.
Isn't that quote, unquote natural?
So I think that we might want to at some point in time end
up trying to define terms like natural versus synthetic just
to get a better bearing, a better handle
on what the distinction is supposed to be.
Let's talk a little bit about now some ethical positions.
What is called anthropocentrism, of course,
is almost literally a human-centered morality.
The idea being here that it's humans
that have intrinsic value,
if anything does, and moral standing.
And whatever it is that we're calling the natural world only
has instrumental value.
So on the anthropocentric view we can cut down trees,
and build a world, and carve a world.
And we can do it without worrying too terribly much
about having to regard, let us say,
the tree like the one you see pictured there,
as having moral standing in and of itself.
The tree is good for us.
It is usable to us.
It could be usable to us as wood for the fireplace or as a source
of lumber for a cabin.
It could even be instrumental in the sense
in which it's just beautiful to behold,
in which case you might then want to consider whether
or not there would be value in the absence of human beings,
or something like a human being to value it.
Of course, there's a lot of literature that provokes a lot
of thought and thought experimentation with the idea
that maybe a beautiful forest or a great tree
like that has value independent of human beings.
But on the anthropocentric view it would seem fairly clearly
that one could say that anything that has moral value
at all is based upon our centrality,
our human evaluative capabilities.
If we look out for human needs, according to anthropocentrism,
then we're going to protect nature.
It's in our best interest to conserve.
And I would say that that probably is the idea behind
that early 20th-century movement
where on the one hand you've got somebody like John Muir
who is thinking in terms of preservation,
and then you've got a few other folks on the other side --
I think Teddy Roosevelt probably was on the other side
of the coin -- who would have felt that conservation,
land management, resource use.
And given our discussions that we've had about Aldo Leopold,
I think he started being a conservationist and ended
up being more of a preservationist.
But I think that he still had a conservationistic bias there.
But if we're conservationists we're probably looking at,
you know, quite possibly an anthropocentrism.
We should preserve wetlands, save rainforests.
Rainforests provide oxygen.
That's obviously true, and human beings benefit.
And of course, another very interesting notation that has
to be made is that these rainforests apparently are
thought to still harbor a variety of natural medications
for certain human ailments, and that in the long run, of course,
would be good for human beings, so let's conserve them.
I propose this problem here of blowing up the world
if you're the last human only to get you to think a little bit
about the fact that, you know, maybe you --
if you were an anthropocentrist you might say, "Look, I'm it.
I'm Omega Man.
And this is it, after I'm dead none of this is going
to be valuable anymore."
It will not be instrumentally valuable, I suppose,
to a human because the humans are gone.
Probably still would be instrumentally valuable,
however, to some of the animals.
I mean, I don't know that people talk that way too terribly much.
Probably a way of suggesting
that there's still instrumental value for some
at least sentient being.
So that doesn't appear to me
to be the worst problem to have to solve.
There's something that I think, at least in terms
of my experience, as a relatively newer piece
of vocabulary called sentio-centrism, and that's,
of course, a little bit different than previous --
what we previously talked about.
Sentient-being-centered morality.
Sentient beings, animals that feel pain and possibly pleasure,
I want to add there, have intrinsic value,
and they have moral standing.
So if you happen to be a sentient creature then you have
a somewhat privileged place,
not unlike an intelligent sapient-type
like anthropocentrism.
But in this particular case it would look
as though we are talking about the primacy of the ability
to feel pleasure and pain.
And consequently the rest
of the natural world could be looked upon
as instrumental value, at least to other creatures,
even if human beings weren't around.
So since humans are part of the animal kingdom,
I suppose you could say, and we share
with other animals our sentience we all have certain kinds
of rights, it could be argued, and interests that would have
to be considered when we're making some kind
of a moral decision.
Biocentrism is probably closely aligned with deep ecology.
And what this essentially says is that living beings,
individual organisms, not just species, have intrinsic value.
So we're taking this down to the very particular level.
And of course, part of the idea being biocentrism is
that humans are not regarded as superior to other life forms
and shouldn't be regarded as being privileged.
They have to respect the fact that there are other organisms
that are sharing a life in an ecosystem, or in larger systems,
and that there's an entitlement, if it can be --
if we can use that term -- for each and every one of us
as individual organism, not simply as species.
So the idea, of course, here would be to try not
to harm other creatures, try not to harm nature.
And sometimes what follows
from biocentrism is becoming a vegetarian.
And of course, we would have noticed that a little bit,
interestingly enough, in the ecological footprint quiz
where it does seem like two main things can cause your volume
of Earths to go way up, one of which is meat eating,
and the other, of course, is gas consumption and the way
in which you transport yourself hither and yon.
So biocentrism does lend itself a little bit to the concept
that by eating vegetarian we're going to cut down on the amount
of land significantly that needs to be cultivated,
and thereby not impact organisms that are living
in certain ecosystems.
And that's --
>> So here we are, ladies and gentlemen,
we've finally reached the day of the James Cameron interview.
With about 20,000 votes from you guys on the Internet,
and finally I've got the top 10 questions to ask James.
Here we go.
What inspired you to make "Avatar"?
>> Well, that's going to be a longer than one-minute answer.
No, it was really inspired by my love of the natural world.
As I kid I was, you know, basically a nerd
that spent all my time out in the woods.
You know, I loved being alone
out in the woods collecting bugs,
and frogs, and things like that.
And at the same time I was growing up on a steady diet
of science fiction, loved reading it,
loved watching science fiction movies.
So you put that all into a blender, and you spin it up,
and what you get is "Avatar."
>> Fantastic.
>> There was no sort of one-point inspiration.
There was a collective of many things.
>> Yeah, I mean, "Avatar" is obviously visually stunning,
and congratulations on the Oscars as well for that.
We've got a question here from someone
in California called Rich P. They said, "What do you consider
to be a successor now that you've set the barrier so high?"
Do you think can be a successor to this film
in the quality of the 3-D?
>> Oh, absolutely, sure.
I mean, I have a number of projects in mind
for a next film, one of which would be a second "Avatar" film.
And you know, I think we know exactly how
to achieve the visual quality that we did on "Avatar."
You know, the trick to it is creating a story that's both
satisfying enough and surprising enough
to justify doing a sequel, which is something I'm working on.
>> When you were creating the film did you imagine the society
on Earth in the future?
Were there other colonies other than the one on Pandora?
>> Ah, we got a real science fiction fan here.
>> I know.
>> Wants to know a little more about the universe.
I visualize a future in -- for the purposes of this film
in which there are no other start systems
that are currently colonized except for Alpha Centauri.
But our Alpha Centauri star system,
because it's a binary system -- it's actually trinary system,
but it's a -- there are two suns, Alpha Centauri A and B,
and they have a number of planets,
and around those planets a number of moons.
And it's a quite complex system.
The idea is it's the closest start system to us,
and we've found something unbelievably valuable there,
a second Earth, a very Earth-like world.
And one that has incredibly valuable resources,
so we've focused our attention on that.
And we've created our interstellar commerce economy
based on going to the nearest star system.
But you know, for purposes
of subsequent stories there's plenty in the Alpha Centauri A,
B system to keep us busy for 20 movies.
We don't have to go zapping all over the galaxy.
That's not the point of this.
The idea is to create a slightly more realistic future
interstellar economy.
>> And obviously with this came quite an environmental message
through the movie.
Do you plan to enhance that message further
than the screenplay, sort of following this film?
>> Well, I mean, I'm very involved right now with a number
of environmental causes that have approached me
because of the resonance between, you know, "Avatar"
and their particular cause.
For example, you know, indigenous rights
in the Amazon Basin and things like that, and you know,
global warming, and deforestation issues, and so on.
So I'm, you know, going around, doing speaking engagements.
We're going to be releasing the DVD on Earth Day,
which is a great opportunity to remind people that
"Avatar" is an environmental film.
It's not just a, you know,
big science fiction action adventure.
It's a film that has this -- these other themes in it,
and these are things that we all need to be thinking about.
>> Do you think that might be included
in the special features sort of thing of the DVD?
>> Right, now the DVD that we're releasing
on April 22nd is the movie
with no special features, just the movie.
But it's just the movie.
There's no kind of crap trailers all, you know,
running up to the start of the movie.
It's you put the disk in, and it's the movie.
It's the -- it's a very pure experience
of the film properly authored, and so on.
And the reason I want to do that is because then we're going
to do this kind of uber-box set
for the holiday season later in the year.
And right now we're preparing all the additional scenes
and that sort of thing.
And I definitely want to include stuff that is about the --
kind of the environmental themes of the film,
and about how "Avatar" maps to real issues
in our world right now.
With the idea of the amount of forest that's being destroyed,
what the negative impact of that is going to be to all
of us everywhere, even if we don't live next to that forest.
What the negative impact
of displacing these indigenous cultures
or destroying their habitats, what that is
for everybody, how we all lose.
>> I admire the way you sort of wrapped it all up in "Avatar,"
which isn't completely obvious, in your face,
but it does have these subtle messages of this.
I think that's fantastic.
>> Right, you know, I think it's interesting that, you know,
you can have a film like "Inconvenient Truth"
which actually gives you a lot of facts,
but it's not a particularly emotional film.
In fact, it's not emotional at all.
"Avatar" is exactly the opposite.
It doesn't give you any facts at all.
It assumes you know the facts or you know the issues.
It gives you an emotional context.
It gives you a sense of, let's say, almost moral outrage
when you see the tree destroyed, when you see the people gassed,
and displaced from their ancestral home, and so on.
And out of that sense of outrage you then evolve to a sense
of triumph and hope because good conquers evil
at the end of the film.
I think you put those two emotions together,
and it could be effective in galvanizing people
to actually do something in a way
that having all the facts only triggers a sense of denial.
>> When we continue to follow Jake and Neytiri
in the upcoming film will we see flashbacks
of Jake's previous life?
>> That's something I'm toying with
but I haven't made a decision about.
In other words, do we see Sam Worthington appear
in a photographic form?
>> And, yeah, previously to his escapade on --
>> Yeah, well, you know, he's a good-looking bloke,
and it would be nice to put him
on camera again, but we don't need to.
I mean, probably the story will progress forward
and not necessarily go into flashback.
That would be my guess right now.
>> So I assume that he won't be ever --
is he locked in the Avatar body now, and --
>> His human body is dead.
>> It's completely gone forever?
>> Absolutely.
>> Okay, thank you very much.
I look forward to the sequel, James.
>> Yeah, okay.
>> Thanks for talking to YouTube.
>> We'll get after that.
>> Thank you.
>> We'll get right on that.